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Abstract 
We use a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring a banking sector to assess the 
interaction between macroprudential policy and monetary policy. We find that in “normal” 
times (when the economic cycle is driven by supply shocks) macroprudential policy 
generates only modest benefits for macroeconomic stability over a “monetary-policy-only” 
world. And lack of cooperation between the macroprudential authority and the central bank 
may even result in conflicting policies, hence suboptimal results. The benefits of introducing 
macroprudential policy tend to be sizeable when financial or housing market shocks, which 
affect the supply of loans, are important drivers of economic dynamics. In these cases a 
cooperative central bank will “lend a hand” to the macroprudential authority, working for 
broader objectives than just price stability in order to improve overall economic stability.  
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The  debate  on  macroprudential  policies  ignited  by  the  financial  crisis  is  in  full 
swing. Essentially, it turns on the thesis that so far policymakers in different spheres – 
mainly financial supervisors, but also monetary policymakers and accounting standard 
setters – have overlooked systemic risk, or at least not taken it properly into account. In 
the run up to the crisis it was not clear who should be concerned with systemic risk. 
Micro prudential supervisors typically focus on single institutions and are accordingly 
liable  to  neglect  risks  outside  their  purview  –  risks  that  may  be  negligible  for  the 
individual  institution  but  may  nevertheless  add  up  in  the  aggregate.
2  Central  banks 
concentrate  on  price  stability  and  may  not  be  sufficiently  concerned  with  financial 
stability.  Meanwhile,  the  various  financial  sectors  are  often  under  the  jurisdiction  of 
different authorities, greatly complicating thorough analysis, let alone action, on systemic 
risk. These considerations, which loom large in the regulatory agenda, have led the major 
countries to establish new institutions, or strengthen existing ones, with a mandate for 
financial stability.
3  
Certainly,  a  primary  purpose  of  macroprudential  policies  must  be  to  limit  the 
accumulation of financial risks, in order to reduce the probability and mitigate the impact 
of a financial crash.
4 Its pursuit will likely require the macroprudential authority to adjust 
                                                 
1   An earlier version of this paper was presented at the CEPR – European Banking Center conference “Procyclicality 
and financial regulation”, University of Tilburg, Tilburg, 11 12 March 2010, as “Macroeconomic Stabilization 
Policies: Grafting Macroprudential Tools in a Macroeconomic Framework”. We benefited from comments by 
Javier  Bianchi,  Martina  Cecioni,  Martin  Eichenbaum,  Luca  Guerrieri,  Matteo  Iacoviello,  Jinill  Kim,  Robert 
Kollman, Caterina Mendicino, Alessandro Notarpietro, Simon Potter, Pau Rabanal, Sergio Santoro, Luca Sessa 
and Skander Van den Heuvel. We thank participants at seminars at the European Central Bank, the Norges Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve as well as participants at the 
above  mentioned  CEPR/EBC  conference,  the  Hong  Kong  Institute  for  Monetary  Research/BIS  conference 
“Financial Stability: Towards a Macroprudential Approach”, 5 7 July 2010, and the EIEF Banca d’Italia Banque 
de France conference “The future of monetary policy”, 30 September   1 October 2010. The views expressed in the 
paper  do  not  necessarily  reflect  those  of  the  Bank  of  Italy.  Corresponding  author:  Stefano  Neri,  e mail: 
stefano.neri@bancaditalia.it 
2   See Brunnermeier et al., (2009). 
3   Newly established macroprudential institutions are the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the European 
Union and the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in the United States. In the United Kingdom the 2009 
Banking Act gives the Bank of England broad powers in this field. 
4   A second key purpose is to strengthen the resilience of the financial sector. This can be achieved by a variety of 
tools: higher capital requirements, new liquidity buffers (Committee of European Banking Supervisors, 2009), 
policies to address the “too big to fail” problem, regulation of derivatives markets (Financial Stability Board, 
2009). The adjustment of these tools would likely be infrequent or even one off. Economists quite commonly   6 
its  policy  tools  dynamically,  to  counter  the  build up  of  risks  during  upswings  and 
attenuate credit contraction and excessive risk aversion in downturns.  
In this paper we study the effectiveness and consequences of these macroprudential 
policies  and  their  interaction  with  monetary  policy.  Our  motivation  is  fourfold.  First, 
countercyclical macroprudential policy is linked to other policies that moderate cyclical 
fluctuations – above all monetary policy, which bears on such macroprudential variables 
as asset prices and credit. And as macroprudential policy has direct or indirect effects on 
these variables it is likely to influence the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
Yet the interaction between the two has received surprisingly little attention.  
Second, there is a relatively well defined set of proposals for the instruments of 
macroprudential  policy.  Countercyclical  capital  requirements  and  loan to value  (LTV) 
ratios are at the centre of the policy debate. Some countries have already started using 
them, and the new macroprudential authorities established in the main world regions may 
well  follow  suit  soon.
5    In  addition,  the  newly  approved  Basel  III  reform  package 
envisions a countercyclical capital buffer. So it is important to assess the performance of 
these instruments in a macro context. 
Third, the institutional framework for the relationship between the macroprudential 
authority and the central bank differs from country to country. At one extreme, the Bank 
of  England  has  been  assigned  full  responsibility  for  macroprudential  policy.  In  the 
European  Union,  central  banks  have  a  prominent  role  in  the  ESRB,  although  other 
institutions (e.g. financial supervisors) are also represented. The United States is close to 
the  opposite  extreme:  the  Federal  Reserve  participates  in  the  FSOC  with  nine  other 
members,  but  has  no  privileged  role  save  that  warranted  by  its  superior  skills  in 
macroeconomic and financial analysis. Each of these institutional setups has pros and 
cons. Having two independent authorities may enhance accountability and reinforce the 
commitment needed to achieve objectives, but with a risk of coordination failures that 
may well yield suboptimal results.  
Finally, analysis of the proposals on macroprudential policies has generally lacked 
the sort of consistent framework that would allow a structured approach. As a result, the 
                                                                                                                                               
distinguish between these two goals, which are not mutually exclusive. See Borio (2003), (2010), Bank of England 
(2009), Committee on the Global Financial System (2010). 
5  Korea introduced caps on LTV ratios in 2002, adjusting them periodically to offset the build up of pressures in the 
housing market. The Hong Kong SAR tightened mortgage LTV ratios in August 2010. China and Singapore also 
recently announced higher down payment requirements for house purchases.   7 
process of institutional reform is well ahead of its theoretical and practical underpinning, 
and faces important challenges. At best, the new macroprudential authorities will have to 
“invent”  ways  to  perform  their  functions.  At  worst,  they  may  fail  to  achieve  their 
objectives.  
This  paper  presents  a  framework  within  which  to  analyse  the  impact  of 
macroprudential  policy  and  its  interaction  with  monetary  policy  on  macroeconomic 
performance and stability. We introduce a formal definition of macroprudential policy 
objectives and instruments in a macroeconomic model. This presents several challenges. 
First,  modelling  macroprudential  policy  –  objectives  and  instruments  –  is  largely 
uncharted  territory.  While  a  new  strand  of  literature  (surveyed  below)  is  developing 
rapidly,  the  financial  sector  has  been  relatively  neglected  in  macroeconomics  until 
recently and is still largely ignored in discussions of policies’ implications for financial 
stability. Second, like most macroeconomic models ours does not explicitly include the 
distortion that macroprudential policy should address, namely systemic risk. This partly 
reflects the elusive nature of systemic risk, which impedes fully rigorous modelling.
6 
Since these difficulties put a rigorous normative approach beyond reach for now, we 
adopt a positive approach. That is, we take the presence of macroprudential regulation for 
granted. We do not analyse its rationale or microeconomic determinants but only study its 
effect on the economy and its interaction with monetary policy. To model the operational 
objective and tools of the macroprudential authority, we draw on policymakers’ stated 
goals and the actions they have taken. As to the objective, there is broad consensus on 
avoiding “excessive” lending to the private sector and containing the cyclical fluctuations 
of  the  economy.  So  we  assume  that  the  macroprudential  authority  minimizes  a  loss 
function whose arguments are the variances of the loans to output ratio and of output. We 
discuss these choices and assess the robustness of our results to alternative objectives. As 
to  instruments,  we  take  countercyclical  capital  requirements  and  LTV  ratios.
7  Our 
modelling of monetary policy is standard: the central bank sets the parameters of a simple 
Taylor rule to minimize the variance of inflation and output. Overall, we believe that our 
                                                 
6   Systemic risk can arise in different ways with respect to market participants (a bank run or the default of an 
investment  firm),  markets  (stock  market  crashes  or  currency  crises)  and  geographical  areas  (domestic  vs. 
international crises). 
7   Clearly, other instruments could be examined, depending on the nature of the risk considered. A systemic shock to 
funding and market liquidity would require measures targeted specifically to illiquidity problems (see for instance 
Perotti and Suarez, 2010).    8 
approach is a useful starting point for addressing the formidable conceptual and practical 
problems of modelling countercyclical macroprudential policy. 
We posit two cases of interaction between macroprudential and monetary policy. In 
the “cooperative” case, the two authorities jointly and simultaneously implement their 
policy  rules  in  order  to  minimize  a  common  objective  (loss)  function.  In  the  “non 
cooperative” case each authority minimizes its own objective function, taking the other’s 
policy rule as given. 
We use the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model developed by 
Gerali  et  al.  (2010),  which  has  some  useful  features  for  our  purpose.  For  one,  it  is 
estimated, which makes it particularly appropriate for a positive analysis such as ours. 
More importantly, it incorporates a banking sector and its meaningful interaction with the 
real economy, which the DSGE models of the previous generation did not.
8 While simple 
enough to allow us to trace the source of the main effects, our banking sector is also 
realistic  enough  to  allow  the  proper  modelling  of  our two  candidate  macroprudential 
policy  instruments,  which  affect  real  and  financial  variables  through  channels 
independent from monetary policy. In particular, the supply of credit to the real economy 
is constrained by the availability of bank capital (as in the Basel regulation), which can 
only  be  accumulated  gradually  through  retained  earnings.  This  friction  makes  the 
economy vulnerable to a shock to bank capital and gives a potentially powerful role to 
macroprudential policy. In the event of a negative shock to bank capital, lowering the 
requirement could avert deleveraging and its repercussions on economic growth. Notice 
that  this  intervention  would  be  genuinely  macroprudential  in  nature,  in  that  in  these 
circumstances a microprudential regulator would want to increase capital requirements. 
Our  results  suggest  that  macroprudential  policy  can  improve  macroeconomic 
stability, but important qualifications are needed. In “normal” times – when the cycle is 
mainly driven  by  supply  shocks –  macroprudential policy  yields  negligible additional 
benefits over a “monetary policy only” world, even if the two authorities cooperate; and 
non cooperation may even produce excessive volatility of the policy tools (interest rates 
for  the  central  bank,  capital  requirements  for  the  macroprudential  authority).  This  is 
because  macroprudential  policy  and  monetary  policy  act  on  closely  related  variables 
                                                 
8   The financial accelerator mechanism of Bernanke et al. (1999) has only recently been re considered in standard 
medium scale DSGE models (see for example Gilchrist et al., 2009).   9 
(interest rates, credit supply, etc.) but have different objectives, so that at times they may 
push in different directions.   
The benefits of introducing macroprudential policy become sizeable when economic 
fluctuations are driven by financial or housing market shocks, which affect the supply of 
loans,  and  are  greater  still  when  the  central  bank  and  the  macroprudential  authority 
cooperate  closely.  In  this  case  the  former  “lends  a  hand”  to  the  latter,  working  for 
objectives  beyond  mere price  stability  in order to enhance the overall  stability of the 
economy.  
All in all, our results suggest that the benefits of macroprudential policy depend 
crucially on the source and magnitude of the shocks and on the degree of coordination 
with monetary policy. If mismanaged, macroprudential policy could generate undesired 
variability in economic variables such as interest rates and capital requirements without 
much improvement in other dimensions.  
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  the  recent  literature  on 
macroprudential  policy  modelling  and  describes  our  model.  In  particular,  section  2.2 
specifies  the  channels  through  which  monetary  and  macroprudential  policies 
independently affect the economy. Section 3 lays out the interaction between the two 
authorities, with a detailed discussion of the macroprudential objective function. Section 4 
gives the main results, Section 5 offers a robustness analysis, and Section 6 concludes. 
2  Modelling macroprudential policies  
2.1  Current modelling approaches to macroprudential policy 
The  ideal  framework  within  which  to  study  macroprudential  policy  should  be 
simple enough to allow a proper understanding of the underlying mechanisms but also 
realistic enough to offer guidance to policymakers in this new environment. That is, it 
should allow macroprudential policy and monetary policy to coexist usefully (hard to do 
in a simple framework).
9 Another important requisite for such a framework should be 
allowance for the particular distortion that macroprudential policy is supposed to address 
– systemic risk.  
                                                 
9   For instance, in a standard AS AD New Keynesian model, the two policies would be linearly dependent, insofar as 
both ultimately influence the only control available to the policymaker, the interest rate – either via open market 
operations or via changes in the capital requirement.   10 
These features are rarely combined in a single model. To our knowledge, none of 
the  existing  analytical  frameworks  features  full fledged  modelling  of  systemic  risk, 
although several recent contributions come close. Bianchi (2009), Bianchi and Mendoza 
(2010),  Mendoza  (2010),  and  Jeanne  and  Korinek  (2010),  modifying  the  framework 
pioneered by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), show that when access to credit is subject to an 
occasionally  binding  collateral  constraint,  a  credit  externality  arises,  driving  a  wedge 
between the competitive and the planner equilibria. The externality induces households to 
overborrow, as they fail to internalize the effect of their own actions on the price of the 
collateral. But it is not clear how robust this externality is. Depending on certain features 
and  parameterizations,  the  model  can  display  not  only  overborrowing  but  also 
underborrowing (Benigno et al., 2010), which may even predominate (Benigno et al., 
2011).
10  Brunnermeier  and  Sannikov  (2011)  study  a  continuous time,  global  (non 
linearised)  model  in which certain agents (“experts”) have superior skills  in  selecting 
profitable projects but limited net worth. In normal times the economy is in a steady state 
with low volatility, but it occasionally lapses into a regime with high volatility induced by 
strong negative feedback from large losses by the “experts”. At the heart of the loop there 
lies  an  externality,  in  that  individually  market  participants  take  prices  as  given,  but 
collectively they affect them. A common problem with these models is that in order to 
overcome technical and computational complexities they are extremely simplified. Often 
they have an insufficient level of detail in treating the financial sector or monetary policy, 
or both, and are accordingly unsuitable for our purposes. 
Several recent papers have analysed issues of financial stability in more standard 
macroeconomic models. Woodford (2010) and Cúrdia and Woodford (2010), proxying 
financial instability by an exogenous process for the spread between loan and deposit 
rates, show that a Taylor type monetary policy rule that also includes a forward looking 
indicator of financial distress based on this spread is welfare improving. But systemic risk 
is not modelled. Another strand in the literature uses models with a banking sector and 
bank capital. The paper most closely related to ours is Bean et al. (2010), presenting a 
modified version of Gertler and Karadi (2009) to study the interaction between monetary 
and macroprudential policy. However, they model macroprudential policy as a levy on (or 
subsidy to) banks that directly affects capital, whereas we model countercyclical capital 
buffers and loan to value ratios explicitly, which brings the analysis closer to the current 
                                                 
10   Bianchi  and  Mendoza  (2010)  themselves  find  that  overborrowing  arises  in  the  competitive  equilibrium  for 
reasonable values of the key parameters, but not for all values.    11 
policy debate. In Angeloni and Faia (2009) the banking system is subject to the risk of 
runs, and monetary policy reacts not only to inflation and output but also to asset prices or 
leverage.  Kannan  et  al.  (2009)  use  a  DSGE  model  with  housing  and  find  that  a 
macroprudential tool to attenuate the credit cycle can help monetary policy in stabilizing 
the economy. Covas and Fujita (2010) examine the effects of capital requirements on the 
business  cycle  in  a  model  with  agency  problems  à  la  Holmstrom  and  Tirole  (1998). 
N’Dyaie (2009) finds that countercyclical capital rules enable the monetary authorities to 
achieve their output and inflation targets with smaller changes in interest rates. Catte et al. 
(2010), positing that the macroprudential authority can directly affect mortgage spreads, 
show that a tightening through this instrument would have curbed the US house price 
boom  between  2003  and  2006  with  modest  repercussions  on  the  other  variables.  A 
common finding of these papers is that a macroprudential instrument to moderate the 
credit cycle could potentially reduce output fluctuations. Ordinarily, however, they do not 
consider strategic interactions between macroprudential and monetary policy. 
2.2  The key mechanisms in our model 
In this paper we take the DSGE model developed in Gerali et al. (2010) as a suitable 
middle ground in the trade off between simplicity and realism. To a model with credit 
frictions and borrowing constraints, as in Iacoviello (2005), and a set of real and nominal 
frictions, as in Christiano et al. (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2003), Gerali et al. (2010) 
add a stylized banking sector. The economy is populated by entrepreneurs, heterogeneous 
households  and  monopolistically  competitive  banks.  Patient  households  (the  savers) 
deposit their savings in the banks. Impatient households and firms borrow, subject to a 
binding  collateral  constraint.
11  Firms  produce  consumer  and  investment  goods  using 
labour  supplied  by  households  and  capital.  Banks’  assets  are  loans  to  firms  and 
households, their liabilities are deposits and capital.  
Banks aim at keeping the capital asset ratio close to an exogenous target level n, 
which we interpret as a capital requirement imposed by the regulator, as in the Basel 
Accords.  We do  not provide  microfoundation requirements.
12 This target incorporates 
                                                 
11   Technically, the two types of household differ in the discount factor they apply to the stream of future utility. This 
heterogeneity gives rise to borrowing and lending in equilibrium (see Gerali et al., 2010).  
12    See e.g. Acharya et al. (2010) for a microfoundation of bank capital and a justification of regulatory minimum 
requirements. In their framework, the optimal capital structure balances the benefits of high leverage (ensuring 
adequate monitoring by creditors and shareholders, to limit rent seeking by managers) against its drawbacks (risk   12 
into the model the basic accelerator mechanism described by Adrian and Shin (2008), 
which arguably played a major role in the financial crisis.
13 The exogeneity of n is an 
important feature of our model, discussed below. 
In what follows we present the equations that are crucial for the interaction between 
monetary policy and our two macroprudential instruments; for a full description of the 
analytical framework see Gerali et al. (2010). 
We start with the equations for the analysis of countercyclical capital requirements. 
Bank capital Kb,t is accumulated out of retained profits Πb:  
(1)        ( ) 1 , 1 , ,   1 - - P + - = t b t b b t b K K d  
where δb is a depreciation rate. By equation (1), banks can increase their capital only 
through retained earnings. This is another important feature of our model, to which we 
return  below.  The  interest  rate  on  loans  to  credit constrained  households  (H)  and 
entrepreneurs (E) is given by the following first order condition:  





























, m is a  non zero mean exogenous shock, which  can  be  interpreted as a time 
varying mark up arising from banks’ monopolistic power; Rt is the monetary policy rate; 
' f  is the first order derivative of a decreasing and convex function measuring the costs 
incurred  by  the  bank  when  the  ratio  of  its  capital  to  loans  (L)  deviates  from  the 
requirement nt set by the macroprudential authority; and the term Adj captures the costs 
for adjusting bank rates, accounting for their stickiness.
14 Equation (2) can be interpreted 
as a  loan  supply  schedule.  When  loans  increase, the capital asset ratio falls  below νt, 
inducing the bank to raise the lending rate. This, in turn, reduces the demand for credit.  
                                                                                                                                               
shifting to the detriment of debt holders). Van Den Heuvel (2008) presents a microfoundation of capital in a 
general equilibrium model. 
13   We distinguish between the capital asset ratio and leverage, as we modify the adjustment cost function used in 
Gerali et al. (2010) to account for the risk sensitive regulation of capital. We replace total loans Lt with the sum of 
risk weighted loans to firms L
F
t and to households L
H
t. To account for cyclicality in risk weights, the empirical 
specification  assumes  that  they  depend  on  the  yearly  output  growth  rate: 
( ) ( ) ( )
i




t w y y w w 1 4 1 1 - - + - - + - = r c r r , where 
i w is the risk weight of agent type i and y is output. See 
Angelini et al. (2009) for a description of the estimation method. 
14   This term comprises bank rates both lagged and expected one period ahead. It implies that the costs related to the 
bank’s capital position are transferred gradually to the lending rate.    13 
The  interest  rate  on  deposits  R
D,  the  relevant  rate  for  savers’  choices  between 
consumption and savings, is given by: 






t Adj R R
, + = m  
where 
D
t m is  a  non zero mean  exogenous  shock,  which  can  be  interpreted  as  a  time 
varying mark down on the policy rate, and the term Adj, similarly to Eq. (2), captures the 
cost of adjusting the deposit rate. 
Equations (2) and (3) help us see why in this model macroprudential and monetary 
policies have independent roles. The monetary policy rate  t R  has an immediate impact on 
both the lending and deposit rates, but the macroprudential instrument νt has an immediate 
impact  only  on  the  lending  rate.  Manoeuvring  their  instruments  separately,  the  two 
policymakers  can  drive  a  wedge  between  the  two  rates  and,  ultimately,  exert  an 
independent effect on the consumption choices of savers and borrowers.
15  
Next, we look at the main equations through which our second candidate macro 
prudential  instrument,  the  LTV  ratio,  affects  the  economy.  The  optimal 
consumption/saving choices of patient households and of credit constrained households 
are described by the following Euler equations (s and b superscripts stand for savers and 
borrowers): 
























































j  are  the  discount  factors,  β
s  >β
b;  c  is  consumption;  and  π  is  inflation.  The 
equations define the optimal consumption choices. For savers (equation 4) they depend on 
the current and expected real returns on deposits. For borrowers (equation 5) they depend 
                                                 
15   The Adj terms disappear if the assumption of sticky loan and deposit rates is dropped. Therefore, this assumption is 
not strictly necessary to study the role of capital requirements as a macroprudential policy tool. But the assumption 
of  monopolistic competition is necessary, since without it steady state bank capital will be zero. A spread between 
deposit and lending rates is also the channel through which financial factors enter the models in Cúrdia and 
Woodford (2010) and Woodford (2010). In their setup the spread depends on exogenous factors (such as bank 
intermediation  costs)  and  debt.  By  contrast, in  Bean  et  al. (2010) the spread is driven  by  monetary  policy; 
macroprudential policy is directly modelled by a tax/injection of bank capital, which has a one to one effect on 
real investment by non financial firms and is therefore very powerful.   14 
on the current and expected real cost of bank loans 
H B
t R
, , but also on λt, the Lagrange 
multiplier of the borrowing constraint: 
(6)        ] [ ) 1 ( 1 1
,






t h q E m b   R p  
where 
h
t q is the price of housing, ht the stock of existing homes, 
H
t b the amount borrowed 
from banks, and 
H
t m  the LTV ratio for mortgages.  
Equations  (4)  through  (6)  show  how  macroprudential  policy  can  influence  the 
economy independently of monetary policy. The monetary policy rate Rt affects both R
D 
and R
B,H  via equations (2) (3), and hence the consumption and  investment choices of 
savers (via equation 4), and borrowers (via equation 5). In setting 
H
t m , macroprudential 
policy affects the stringency of the borrowing constraint λt. This has no effect on equation 
(4) but does affect equation (5). As the collateral constraint tightens and λt  increases, 
borrowers’ ability to finance consumption and housing investment is reduced, so both 
these  types  of  spending  fall.
16  Note  that  in  this  case  the  independent  role  of 
macroprudential  policy  stems  from  the  presence  of  credit constrained  agents;  in  this 
setup, if λt  falls to zero monetary policy  and  macroprudential policy  become  linearly 
dependent.  
3  Modelling monetary and macroprudential policies 
In this section we discuss the objectives and the instruments of the central bank and 
the macroprudential authority. 
3.1  Monetary policy 
We follow the standard practice and assume that the central bank instrument can be 
modelled via a Taylor rule with the following specification: 
(7)      ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ] 1 1 1 1 - - + - + - - + - = t R t t y t R R t R y y R R r c p p c r r p     
                                                 
16   A  similar  mechanism is at  work in  Cúrdia and  Woodford  (2010). The  optimal  choices  of  consumption  and 
investment in physical capital by entrepreneurs are characterized by similar first order conditions. Firms borrow 
from banks against the value of their physical capital.   15 
where the parameter  p c  measures the response to deviations of inflation (π) from the 
target,  y c  its response to the growth of output (y) and  R r  the inertia in the adjustment of 
the policy rate. 
The  central  bank  stabilizes  inflation  and  output,  selecting  the  parameters  of  the 
monetary policy rule (7) to minimize the following loss function: 
(8)        0   0,        
2 2
,
2 ³ ³ + + = D r y r r y cb y
cb k k k k L s s sp , 
where s
2 are the asymptotic (unconditional) variances of inflation and output growth and 
of the changes in the policy instrument, i.e. the monetary policy rate. The weights ks 
characterize the policymaker’s preferences over these variables. A positive kr is warranted 
by the need to keep movements in the policy rate “reasonable”, since it is well known that 
if there is no cost for adjusting policy instruments, optimal policies will tend to generate 
excessive volatility in the policy rate. The loss function (8) could be obtained by taking a 
second order approximation of the utility function of households and entrepreneurs, as in 
Woodford (2003) in the case of optimal monetary policy.  
3.2  Macroprudential policy: instruments 
We consider, one at a time, two macroprudential instruments: a capital requirement, 
and an LTV ratio. For capital requirements the rule is:  
(9)        ( ) ( ) 1   1   1 - + - + - = t t t X n r c r n r n n n n n  
where the parameter n  measures the steady state level of  t n . Capital requirements are 
adjusted according to the dynamics of a key macroeconomic variable Xt with a sensitivity 
parameter χν. In the baseline simulations we set Xt equal to the growth of output. In this 
case, a positive value for χν amounts to a countercyclical policy: capital requirements 
increase in good times (banks must hold more capital for a given amount of loans) and 
decrease in recessions.
17  
We  take  capital  requirements  as  our  macroprudential  instrument  for  two  main 
reasons. First, based on past experience systemic crises inevitably affect bank capital and 
the supply of credit, either directly or indirectly. And – not surprisingly – bank capital has 
                                                 
17   Note that equation (9) affects the cyclical pattern of the variables but not their steady state levels. This is because 
the model’s steady state is affected only by n  and not by the dynamics of the variables.    16 
taken centre stage in the ongoing debate on regulatory reform. The capital rule (9) can be 
viewed as an example of the countercyclical capital buffer introduced by Basel III.
18  
Restricting banks’ capital increases to retained earnings (equation (1)) carries two 
significant  implications.  First,  it  rules  out  all  the  other  options  for  recapitalization 
discussed in the recent policy debate (contingent capital, public funds, etc.): interesting 
and  important  though  they  are,  analysis  of  these  options  would  require  a  far  more 
complex model of banks’ sources of finance. Second, the lack of other sources of funds 
means that remedying a shortage of capital will take time; and, other things being equal, 
this makes macroprudential policy relatively powerful, which should be kept in mind in 
interpreting our results.  
Our  alternative  macroprudential  instrument  is  the  LTV  ratio,  owing  to  its 
importance in the policy debate and the experience of the countries that already use it 
(South  Korea,  China,  Singapore,  Hong  Kong).  Moreover,  the  LTV  ratio  permits  a 
robustness  check  on  the  results  obtained  with  equation  (9).  We  assume  that  the 
macroprudential authority  sets the  LTV ratio mt  for  loans to households using a rule 
similar to equation (9):  
(10)        ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 - + - + - = t m t m m m t m X m m r c r r    
Our  instruments  do  capture  one  essential  aspect  of  macroprudential  policy.  As 
Hanson, Kashyap and Stein (2010) point out, when a microprudential regulator requires 
an undercapitalized bank to take prompt corrective action, it is indifferent whether the 
adjustment is made by increasing capital or decreasing assets, as long as the probability of 
default is lowered to an acceptable level. However, asset reduction by many banks at once 
would be likely to damage the economy, contracting aggregate credit supply: “...one can 
characterize the macroprudential approach to capital regulation as an effort to control the 
social  costs associated with excessive  balance sheet shrinkage on the part of  multiple 
financial institutions hit with a common shock” (Hanson, Kashyap and Stein, 2010). Our 
approach  captures  this  essential  feature  of  macroprudential  policy:  the  danger  of 
                                                 
18   One may wonder why banks do not follow a rule like (9) voluntarily. As we argued above, no rigorous answer is 
possible within our framework, since the externality that warrants macroprudential intervention is not present in 
our model. In practice, banks’ incentives to hold and manage capital may be reduced by the possibility of bailouts, 
or by managerial short termism favoured by compensation schemes. Repullo and Suarez (2008) show that banks 
do have incentives to manage capital buffers countercyclically, but that these incentives, per se, are insufficient to 
eliminate the inherent pro cyclicality of regulatory capital requirements.   17 
excessive balance sheet shrinkage may be averted if the macroprudential authority lowers 
the capital requirement.
19  
3.3  Macroprudential policy: objectives 
Modelling the objectives of macroprudential policies is not easy, because systemic 
risk  can  come  in  various  forms  and  environments  and  most  macroeconomic  models 
(including  ours)  have  no  specific  proxy  for  it.  Therefore,  our  specification  of  the 
authority’s  loss  function  needs  discussion.  Our  procedure  could  be  described  as  a 
“revealed preferences” approach: since the objectives of macroprudential policy are not 
clear yet, either in theory or in practice, we try to determine which goals macroprudential 
authorities are actually aiming for.  
Several  clues  can  be  garnered  from  an  influential  policy  paper  by  the  Bank  of 
England (2009), which defines one key source of systemic risk as the “strong collective 
tendency  for  financial  firms,  as  well  as  companies  and  households,  to  overexpose 
themselves to risk in the upswing of a credit cycle, and to become overly risk averse in a 
downswing” (p. 16). The paper says that macroprudential policy should ensure “the stable 
provision of financial intermediation services to the wider economy, [avoiding] the boom 
and bust cycle in the supply of credit …” (p. 9) and suggests framing the authority’s 
objectives in terms of “abnormal” credit expansion. This approach has both empirical and 
theoretical underpinnings. There is substantial evidence that abnormal credit expansions 
tend to lead to financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008; Borio and Drehmann, 2009). 
As for theory, some of the works surveyed in section 2.1 suggest that the amplitude of 
fluctuations in credit cycles can be excessive. 
On this basis we posit that macroprudential authorities take credit as an important 
indicator of financial stability and react to its “abnormal” behaviour. In our model the 
economy  is  more vulnerable to shocks when  leverage (proxied  by the  loans to output 
ratio) is greater.
20 We therefore assume that one key argument of the loss function that the 
authority seeks to minimize is the variance of the loans to output ratio, 
2
/ y l s .  
                                                 
19   This may be difficult during a downturn, as the markets themselves may put pressure on banks to recapitalize 
(Diamond and Rajan, 2009). This concern could be addressed by raising the requirement in normal times so as to 
lend credibility to the reduction dictated by equation (9) in bad times.   
20   The greater the leverage, the more consumption and investment respond to changes in the price of collateral 
(housing and capital) and lending rates (see Iacoviello, 2005).   18 
A second policy reference, Committee on the Global Financial System (2010), calls 
for macroprudential policy to mitigate the “...risk of a disruption of financial services that 
.... has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real economy”. Based 
on  this  indication,  we  assume  that  the  authority  is  also  interested  in  minimizing 
fluctuations in output.  
Finally  in  our  model  the  macroprudential  authority,  like  the  central  bank,  is 
concerned  with  the  variability  of  the  chosen  policy  instrument  and  needs  to  hold  its 
movements  within  reasonable  bounds.  We  accordingly  assume  that  the  authority 
minimizes the following loss function:  




/ n ns s s D + + = k k L y mp y y l
mp     
where mp  stands  for  macroprudential and 
2
n s D   is the  volatility of the changes  in the 
macroprudential instrument (banks’ capital requirements or LTV ratios).  
Equation (11), in our view, captures some important features of the objectives that 
macroprudential authorities will likely set in practice. However, a case can also be made 
for different objective functions, so in section 5 we assess the sensitivity of our results to 
alternative specifications of (11).
21 
4  The interaction between macroprudential and monetary policies 
4.1  The setup of the exercise 
In  this  section  we  study  the  interaction  between  monetary  policy  and 
macroprudential policy in two different cases. In the case of cooperation the policies are 
chosen jointly and optimally by a single policymaker with two instruments (the interest 
rate  and  the  capital  requirement),  with  the  objective  of  stabilizing  the  variances  of 
inflation, output, the loans to output ratio, and the changes in the instruments themselves. 
The  resulting  equilibrium  can  be  taken  as  a  situation  in  which  the  central  bank  is 
responsible for macroprudential policy or cooperates completely with the macroprudential 
                                                 
21   For instance, Bean et al. (2010) assume that the authority is interested in the volatility of output and of real capital. 
Also,  one  might  argue  that  (11)  should  be  cast  solely  in  terms  of  output  stabilization:  why  should  the 
macroprudential authority care about the loans to output ratio, which is at best an indicator of financial instability 
that can lead to output disruption? We respond that in practice the new macroprudential authority is not going to be 
held accountable for any disturbance whatever to real economic activity, but only for disturbances that have a 
financial origin. Thus, its objective function will presumably include proxies for systemic risk in the financial 
system, such as the loans to output ratio.   19 
authority. In formal terms, the values of the five policy parameters in (7) and (9) are 
optimal when they minimize the sum of the two loss functions (8) and (11): 






n n p s s s s s d r r y mp y cb y y l
mp cb k k k k L L L + + + + + = + = D . 
where  the  superscripts  cb  and  mp  denote  the  central  bank  and  the  macroprudential 
authority.  The  solution  of  this  problem  yields  a  tuple  of  parameters 
) , ; , , (
* * * * * c c c
y
c c
R n n p c r c c r  such that: 
) , ; , , (   min arg ) , ; , , (
* * * * *




R L =  
subject  to  the  constraint  given  by  the  model.  The  superscript  c  denotes  the  case  of 
cooperation.
22 
In  the  second  case  we  assume  that  the  monetary  and  the  macroprudential 
policymakers  do  not  cooperate: the  former  minimizes  (8), taking  the  macroprudential 
policy rule (9) as given, while the latter minimizes (11), taking (7) as given. The solution 
of this interaction yields a tuple  ) , ; , , (
* * * * * n n n
y
n n
R n n p c r c c r  such that: 
) , ; , , ( min arg ) , , (
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mp n n L =  
subject, again, to the constraint given by the model. The superscript n denotes the case of 
non cooperation: in practice, the policy chosen by each authority is optimal taking the 
other’s as given. In both cases households and firms are passive, taking policies as given. 
Our analysis resembles that of Petit (1989) and of Dixit and Lambertini (2003), in their 
studies of the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies. 
We compare the outcomes of the two equilibria along different dimensions. In this 
section  the  preference  parameters  are  fixed  as  follows:  ky,cb=0.5,  kr=0.1  in  (9),  and 
ky,mp=0.5, kn=0.1 in (11). The figures for the central bank preferences are broadly in line 
with the  values estimated  in the  literature (see, for example, Ozlale, 2003, and Ilbas, 
                                                 
22   A preliminary question is whether our instruments actually have the power to affect outcomes. For if their effect 
were negligible we would not be giving macroprudential policy a fair chance. To check this, we assume that the 
central bank has objective function (8) but can use two instruments, the policy rate and the capital requirement, 
according to (7) and (9); we then compare this case with the policy rate only case. Unreported results obtained for 
a technology shock show that adding the extra instrument can improve macroeconomic performance significantly.   20 
2011) or used in the calibration of models (Ehrmann and Smets, 2003). In section 5, we 
check robustness with alternative parameterizations. 
Preliminary  attempts  to  minimize  the  joint  loss  (12)  revealed  that  the  results 
depended on initial conditions, which suggests that the function has several local minima. 
To make sure a global minimum was found, we randomly selected different tuples of 
initial  conditions  for  the  parameters  of  the  two  policy  rules  (7)  and  (9).
23  For  non 
cooperation, we take as initial conditions the parameters of the two policy rules found in 
the case of cooperation. 
4.2  Results with a technology shock 
First  we  consider  technology  shocks,  which  are  the  main  drivers  of  cyclical 
fluctuations in our model. The key features of the different outcomes are set out in Table 
1.  We  begin  with  the  case  of  policy  cooperation  (column  (a)).  The  values  for  the 
monetary  policy  responses  to  inflation  and  output  growth  are,  respectively,  1.77  and 
0.92.
24 The optimized macroprudential policy rule suggests that in response to positive 
output growth capital requirements are tightened (the coefficient χν is 1.98).
25  
Under non cooperation – column (b) – the strategies of the two policymakers are 
quite  different.  Macroprudential  policy  becomes  procyclical  (χν  turns  negative),  while 
monetary policy is strongly countercyclical (χy increases to around 65). The joint loss, 
computed  as  the  sum  of  the  two  separate  losses,  is  4.1  percent  worse  than  with 
cooperation.  The  central  bank  stands  to  benefit  from  cooperation  (its  loss  function 
worsens by 8.7 percent under non cooperation). 
Looking within the loss functions in the two cases, the main difference is in the 
volatility of the policy instruments: the variability of the policy rate is 12 times greater 
under  non cooperation,  that  of  capital  requirements  twice  as  great.  This  reflects  the 
                                                 
23   The initial values for χR, χy and χν were drawn from uniform distributions. The ranges are, respectively, [1.7, 3.0], 
[0.0, 1.0] and [ 5.0, 5.0]. The initial values for ρR and ρν were fixed at 0.99 because they either converge to unit 
values, as we show below, or yield local minima.  
24   The optimized coefficients of the monetary rule suggest that strict inflation targeting is not optimal. This reflects 
the frictions present in the model. As is shown by Monacelli (2007), with financial frictions à la Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997), monetary policy has to balance the incentive to undo the price rigidities against that to relax 
borrowing constraints by allowing for inflation variability. In our model strict inflation targeting would reduce the 
volatility of inflation but increase that of output and of the loans to output ratio. 
25   Both policy rules are extremely inertial. The autoregressive parameters r often hit the boundary (set at 0.999 to 
avoid numerical problems). This compares with a value of 0.77 in the monetary policy rule estimated in Gerali et 
al. (2010) and reflects the great persistency of the technology shock and its effects . If we repeat our exercise 
assuming less persistent shocks, the high persistence of the policy rules also tends to vanish.   21 
central  bank’s  strong  reaction  to  output  growth  and  the  procyclical  behaviour  of 
macroprudential policy and implies that the non cooperative solution may give rise to 
substantial problems of coordination. The outcome is reminiscent of the finding of Dixit 
and  Lambertini  (2003)  that  a  non cooperative  game  between  the  monetary  and  fiscal 
authorities  can  result  in  low  output  and  high  inflation  because  fiscal  policy  is  over 
restrictive and monetary policy over expansive.  
Why does this conflict arise? Figure 1, showing the impulse responses of the key 
variables to a negative technology shock, can help us understand their dynamics in the 
two cases (we also report results for the case in which there is only monetary policy). 
First consider the case of cooperation. The combined reaction of the two authorities to the 
shock lowers capital requirements – allowing banks to reduce the capital/asset ratio by 
more than would have been possible otherwise, thus containing the rise in the loan rate – 
but produces almost no change in the monetary policy rate (balancing the contraction of 
output with an increase in inflation).  
Next consider non cooperation. Now the macroprudential authority, faced with an 
increase  in  the  loans to output  ratio  –  a  signal  of  credit  “overheating”  –  reacts  by 
tightening  capital  requirements,  potentially  aggravating  the  fall  in  output.  The  central 
bank is therefore induced to ease aggressively. This, in turn, leads the macroprudential 
authority  to  tighten  further,  and  so  on.  As  a  result  of  this  interaction,  in  the  non 
cooperative case macroprudential policy increases capital requirements substantially in 
response to the rise in the loans to output ratio, in spite of the decline in output. Monetary 
policy  offsets  this  by  an  equally  sharp  cut  in  interest  rates.
26  Clearly,  this  pattern  is 
suboptimal.
27  As  we  shall  see,  better  macroeconomic  results  are  achieved  in  the 
monetary policy only case – a world with no macroprudential policy.  
The conflict stems from the coexistence of two independent authorities that work on 
closely related variables (interest rates and credit supply) but with different objectives. 
The macroprudential authority is interested in financial variables, the central bank only in 
output and inflation. Because the technology shock drives the loans to output ratio up and 
output down, without coordination the two policymakers may adopt conflicting policies 
                                                 
26   The dynamics of the loan rate is dominated by the reduction in the policy rate, which prevails over the increase in 
the cost of adjusting bank capital (induced by higher capital requirements and by the lower capital/asset ratio; see 
equation 2). Overall, however, the effects of the two different policy scenarios on output and inflation are barely 
distinguishable.  
27   Bean et al. (2010) term their similar result a “pull me push you” outcome.   22 
(the two policies remain compatible in the case of shocks that drive the two variables in 
the  same  direction).
28  Although  the  specification  of  (11)  is  ad  hoc,  our  analysis 
nevertheless captures a general result that can emerge whenever the objectives of the 
macroprudential and monetary authorities are not aligned.  
The last column of Table 1 refers to the case in which macroprudential policy is 
absent and the central bank follows the Taylor rule (7) to minimize its loss function (8). 
By comparison with the cooperative equilibrium, the joint loss is practically unchanged, 
but the volatility of the interest rate declines substantially. Surprisingly, the variance of 
the  loans to output  ratio  is  significantly  lower  than  in  the  previous  two  cases.  These 
results apparently suggest that monetary policy alone can do a reasonably good job in 
attaining both monetary and macroprudential objectives. To put it another way, in this 
scenario macroprudential policy would appear to have little if any use. But the outcome is 
quite different in the case of a financial rather than a technology shock, as we discuss in 
section 4.3.  
To sum up, under a technology shock the benefits of macroprudential policy are 
modest  relative  to  the  monetary policy only  scenario.  Indeed,  lack  of  cooperation 
between the central bank and the macroprudential authority could even generate a conflict 
between the two policies, accentuating the variability of the policy instruments, as the 
macroprudential  authority  seeks  to  stabilize  the  loans to output  ratio  (an  indicator  of 
finance driven instability), whereas the central bank cares only about output and inflation. 
4.3  Results with a financial shock 
We now replicate our analyses to examine the effect of a financial shock. Following 
Gerali  et  al.  (2010),  we  model  the  financial  shock  as  an  exogenous  and  unexpected 
destruction of bank capital, affecting the real economy through its impact on the supply of 
credit and on bank lending rates.
29 The results are reported in Table 2.  
                                                 
28     Indeed, if the weight of the loans to output ratio in equation (12) is sufficiently small, the conflict tends to vanish. 
Unreported analyses show that the macroprudential tools may also move procyclically in the case of cooperation, 
but only for a narrow set of configurations of the preference weights (very little weight on output and very large 
weight on the loans to output ratio).  
29   The financial shock is accompanied, in the exercise, by a shock to household preferences, in order to capture the 
decline in consumer confidence during the crisis; this does not affect the conclusions but makes our results more 
realistic and easier to interpret. The preference shock, as in Smets and Wouters (2003) is modelled as a shock to 
consumption  within  households’  utility  function.  In  unreported  simulations  in  which  no  allowance  for  the 
preference shock is made, the main results are unaltered.   23 
Under cooperation, monetary policy responds aggressively to inflation and output 
growth,  and  the  macroprudential  policy  rule  also  calls  for  a  strong  countercyclical 
response  to  output  (χν  equals  9.6).  Under  non cooperation  macroprudential  policy  is 
unchanged, but the monetary policy response to output is significantly weaker; the joint 
loss is 5.8 percent greater than with cooperation. Two key differences with respect to the 
technology shock emerge. First, there is no conflict between the two policies, since the 
financial shock drives output and the loans to output ratio in the same direction (although 
the central  bank’s  much  more  limited reaction to output indicates that a coordination 
problem may still be present). Second, with cooperation the central bank loses and the 
macroprudential authority gains. A possible interpretation is that with a financial shock 
the central bank may deviate from strict adherence to its own objective in order to “lend a 
hand” to maintain financial stability. This intuition is corroborated by the components of 
the loss functions: now the gains from cooperation stem from lower volatility in output, in 
the loans to output ratio and in the capital requirement, and are “paid for” by slightly 
greater variability of inflation and a more activist monetary policy (the volatility of the 
policy rate is greater with cooperation).  
Column (c) of Table 2 compares cooperation with monetary policy only. Now, in 
contrast  to  the  case  of  a  technology  shock,  monetary  policy  alone  is  not  enough  to 
stabilize  the  economy.  Instead, the  availability  of  two  policy  instruments,  if  properly 
coordinated, generates sizeable gains for the stabilization of output and of the loans to 
output ratio.  
Panel B of Figure 1, which reports the impulse responses to a financial shock, helps 
us understand the behaviour of the policymakers. With cooperation, the authorities react 
to the  shortfall  in  bank  capital  by  easing  both  macroprudential  and  monetary  policy. 
Under  non cooperation,  instead, the  monetary policy reaction  is practically  negligible, 
inducing a stronger macroprudential response; the shock has a greater impact on output 
and the loans to output ratio than with cooperation. In the monetary policy only scenario 
the impact is greater still, reflecting the sharper rise in the lending rate and contraction in 
loans.  
To assess the role of macroprudential policy when the economy is highly sensitive 
to shocks to banks’ capital, we replicate our exercises, increasing the values for kb in 
equation (2), the parameter that measures the cost of deviating from the regulatory capital 
ratio  n.  This  exercise  can  be  interpreted  as  proxying  an  environment  in  which   24 
recapitalization is very costly, owing, say, to an underdeveloped capital market, or to 
financial stress (when it is obviously very expensive to raise capital). Three main results 
emerge. First, the gains from macroprudential policy are increasing with kb. When we set 
kb at 5 times the baseline value estimated in Gerali et al. (2010), which is equal to 11.0, 
with cooperation the overall loss is 40 percent less than in the monetary policy only case. 
Second, the gains derive from a large reduction in the volatility of output and of the loans 
to output ratio (which are both 45 to 55 percent lower than with only monetary policy), 
partly offset by a 20 percent rise in the volatility percent of inflation; these results reflect 
the fact that when macroprudential policy is introduced and the policymakers cooperate, 
the central bank internalizes objectives related to financial stability, partly deviating from 
its  own  loss  function.  Third,  the  difference  between  cooperative  and  non cooperative 
scenarios – i.e. the gain from cooperation – increases substantially. 
We  can  now  summarize  the  results  for  the  financial  shock  scenario.  First,  the 
benefits of macroprudential policy over the monetary policy only scenario are substantial, 
and they are proportional to the cost borne by banks for deviating from the requirement. 
Second, the gains from cooperation between monetary and macroprudential policy are 
small in terms of the overall loss function; and they derive from the greater stability of the 
key  macroeconomic  variables.  If  financial  shocks  are  important  factors  in  economic 
dynamics, then cooperation  helps stabilize output and the  loans to output ratio. These 
benefits are “paid for” by activist monetary policy and greater variability of inflation. In 
practice,  in  the  presence  of  financial  shocks  the  central  bank  deviates  from  strict 
adherence to its objectives in order to “lend a hand” to maintain financial stability. 
4.4  An alternative macroprudential policy instrument: the loan to value ratio  
In  this  section  we  replicate  our  exercises,  but  taking  as  our  macroprudential 
instrument the loan to value ratio (LTV), i.e. replacing (9) with (10). We assume that the 
LTV is adjusted in response to house prices – i.e. Xt in equation (10) is the growth of real 
house prices, whereas in (9) it is output growth – because this is the key causal variable 
for the dynamics of loans to households, and because it appears to correspond to the 
actual behaviour of policymakers. 
In the technology shock scenario, the most important results (unreported) are the 
following. First, the macroprudential authority adjusts LTV counter cyclically. Second, 
the benefits of macroprudential policy are negligible by comparison with the monetary   25 
policy only scenario. Third, the benefits of cooperation, as gauged by the joint loss, are 
modest . Again, this result conceals strong heterogeneity in the function’s components. 
Specifically,  the  non cooperation  case  shows  slightly  lower  volatility  of  output  and 
inflation,  but  much  greater  variability  of  the  two  policy  instruments  than  under 
cooperation. In general, all the main results listed in section 4.2 survive the switch to LTV 
as an alternative policy instrument and the use of a different indicator variable for setting 
it. 
We also considered a persistent shock to the demand for housing (and hence to 
house  prices),
30  considering  that  modifying  LTV  is  clearly  the  best  way  to  address 
overheating in the housing sector. The results are reported in Table 3. First, the central 
bank is better off in the case of non cooperation (its loss function and the volatility of the 
policy rate are both much lower). Second, cooperation yields benefits in terms of lower 
variability of output and of the loans to output ratio, “paid for” by heightened volatility of 
inflation and of the policy rate. This result should read along the same lines as in section 
4.3: given a disturbance (here, the housing demand shock), the central bank deviates from 
strict adherence to its objectives in order to “lend a hand” to macroprudential policy. 
Third,  the  benefits  of  macroprudential  policy  are  substantial  by  comparison  with  the 
monetary policy only scenario. The improvement, which is due entirely to the loans to 
output ratio, comes at the expense of greater volatility of output, inflation and the policy 
rate. 
These findings are consistent with those of sections 4.2 and 4.3: macroprudential 
policy has little to contribute in normal times (when the economy is driven by supply 
shocks) but much to do in facing sectoral shocks to the financial sector or the housing 
market.  In  these  cases,  enhancing  the  policymakers’  arsenal  with  an  instrument 
specifically  targeted  to  the  relevant  sector  generates  substantial  macroeconomic 
advantages. 
5  Robustness checks 
Alternative parameterizations of the loss functions (9) and (11). This robustness check is 
important, because the parameter values for our baseline results are not based on strong a 
                                                 
30   Housing demand shocks are modelled as in Gerali et al. (2010) and capture exogenous shifts in the preference for 
housing. These shocks yield a persistent increase in real house prices.   26 
prioris.  Here  we  repeat  the  exercises  of  section  4  under  alternative  choices  for  the 
parameters ks of policymakers’ preferences for the various arguments. Table 4 reports the 
main results for technology and financial shocks, giving the percentage differences in the 
objective functions and their components between the monetary policy only case and the 
case of cooperation (panel A); and between non cooperation and cooperation (panel B). 
For ease of comparison with the baseline results, the first column of each panel reports 
the percentage differences taken from column (b) in Tables 1 and 2.  
The check confirms most of our main results. In the case of technology shocks, no 
matter what weight is assigned to output volatility, macroprudential policy contributes 
very little to the joint stabilization of the objectives of the two policymakers (panel A). 
More precisely, when the importance of output is small for both policymakers (second 
column), the lack of macroprudential policy results in significantly greater volatility of 
the  loans to output  ratio  but  slightly  lower  variability  of  output.  When  output  is  an 
important policy consideration (third column), the opposite obtains. As for the benefits of 
cooperation,  panel  B  confirms  that  they  stem  mainly  from  lower  volatility  of  the 
instruments.  As  in  the  baseline  case,  this  reflects  countercyclical  monetary  and 
procyclical macroprudential policy. 
The results obtained in the previous sections for financial shocks are also robust. In 
particular, in the monetary policy only case (right side of table 4, panel A) output and the 
loans to output ratio are consistently more volatile than under cooperation, for all our 
parameterizations. And the volatility of the policy rate is consistently lower, confirming 
that the  central  bank’s  traditional  loss  function  ignores  financial  stability.  When  both 
types of policy are in place, the failure to cooperate causes greater volatility of output and 
of the loans to output ratio and lower volatility of inflation and the policy interest rate 
(monetary policy does not “lend a hand” to preserve financial stability).  
Alternative specifications of the loss function (11). A second key element underlying our 
results is the specification of the macroprudential policymaker’s preferences. Our choice 
of the arguments in (11) was determined by economic considerations and the simplified 
nature  of  our  model,  leaving  only  a  narrow  set  of  feasible  and  sensible  alternative 
specifications.  Given  a  crucial  role  of  house  prices  in  financial  crises,  one  possible 
alternative  specification  would  be  to  supplement  (11)  with  a  measure  of  house  price 
volatility. Accordingly we simulated the model with technology shocks using a version of 
(11) augmented to include the variance of house prices (weighted at 0.5). The results are   27 
qualitatively  similar  to  those  shown  in  section  4.2:  the  reduction  in  the  overall  loss 
produced  by  introducing  macroprudential  policy  is  small  by  comparison  with  the 
monetary policy only  scenario.  When  both  policies  are  in  place,  failure  to  cooperate 
creates  the  potential  for  conflict:  macroprudential  policy  becomes  procyclical  while 
monetary policy is strongly countercyclical. 
Alternative specifications for the macroprudential policy rule. Since the macroprudential 
authority is interested in the loans to output ratio, a natural alternative specification was 
to add that variable to the right hand  side of  equation (10). The  main results remain 
qualitatively unchanged. Under technology shocks,  macroprudential policy  contributes 
little to the stabilization of the two policymakers’ objectives. The benefits of cooperation 
tend to be smaller. Non cooperation still produces coordination problems, resulting  in 
great volatility of the policy rate, albeit less severe than in the baseline case. For financial 
shocks, the gains from macroprudential policy are greater than in the baseline case, as the 
macroprudential authority reduces the volatility of the loans to output ratio significantly. 
However, the benefit of cooperation relative to non cooperation is more modest than in 
the baseline case. 
Alternative shocks. We have also considered shocks other than technology, financial and 
housing. First, we replicate our exercises assuming a demand shock (modelled as shocks 
to households’ preferences and to the efficiency of investment; see Gerali et al., 2010 for 
more details). The comparison of cooperation with monetary policy only shows that once 
again the best outcome in terms of output and inflation is obtained in the latter case. This 
is not surprising, as demand shocks can be effectively offset by the central bank alone 
(they drive output and inflation in the same direction). Cooperation generates gains at the 
price of greater variability of the policy instruments, and in particular the policy rate.  
Second,  we  considered  a  multi shock  scenario,  factoring  in  all  the  shocks 
considered in Gerali et al. (2010). This exercise is warranted by the consideration that 
macroprudential policy, once in place, will be confronted with a set of shocks that are 
hard  to  disentangle.  Indeed,  this  is  arguably  the  most  realistic  scenario.  Overall,  the 
findings mirror those obtained assuming financial shock alone. The improvement brought 
about  by  macroprudential  policy  with  respect  to  monetary policy only  is  substantial, 
regardless of the type of interaction between the two authorities. The gain reflects less 
volatility  in  output,  inflation  and  the  loans to output  ratio,  at  the  expense  of  greater 
variability in the policy rate.    28 
6  Conclusions 
We have examined the interaction between countercyclical macroprudential policy 
and  monetary policy.  We  have analyzed two cases: one of cooperation,  in which the 
central  bank  and  the  macroprudential  authority  simultaneously  minimize  a  weighted 
average of their two objective (loss) functions; and one of non cooperation, in which each 
authority minimizes its own objective function. The cooperative case captures a situation 
in which the central bank is assigned a pivotal role in macroprudential policy, as in the 
new  European  financial  supervisory  framework.  We  consider  two  alternative 
macroprudential  instruments:  capital  requirement  and  LTV  ratio.  We  also  consider  a 
monetary policy only scenario, featuring only the central bank and no macroprudential 
authority.  
Our  results  suggest that  in  “normal”  times  –  that  is,  when  the  dynamics  of  the 
economy is driven principally by supply shocks – the active use of capital requirements 
by a macroprudential policymaker has little effect on macroeconomic stability. Moreover, 
lack of cooperation between a macroprudential authority and a central bank may actually 
generate conflicting policies, hence excessive volatility of the policy instruments (interest 
rates  and  capital  requirements),  without  greatly  enhancing  the  stability  of  the  key 
macroeconomic variables (output and the loans to output ratio). The conflict reflects the 
coexistence of two independent authorities that act on closely related variables (interest 
rates and credit supply) but have different objectives.  
In  an  environment  in  which  financial  shocks  are  an  important  driver  of 
macroeconomic  fluctuations,  the  picture  changes.  Now  the  additional  macroeconomic 
stability  produced  by  macroprudential  policy  over  monetary  policy  alone  becomes 
significant. And cooperation between the two authorities generates greater benefits still, 
stabilizing output and the loans to output ratio – the objectives of macroprudential policy. 
These gains are “paid for” by greater volatility in the policy rate and possibly somewhat 
greater volatility in the inflation rate. This outcome most likely arises because in the case 
of cooperation the central bank “lends a hand” to macroprudential policy, partly deviating 
from its own targets, whereas in the non cooperative scenario it focuses exclusively on 
price stability and ignores the instability generated by financial shocks. 
We also considered an alternative macroprudential tool, a countercyclical loan to 
value ratio for household mortgages. This part of the analysis confirms that in “normal”   29 
times macroprudential policy has little to contribute to macroeconomic stability and may 
even conflict with  monetary policy,  whereas  it  becomes  important  in the presence of 
financial or sector specific shocks (to the housing market, say). In these cases, extending 
the range of policy tools to include a sector specific instrument can produce substantial 
macroeconomic benefits. These results are robust to a series of modifications to the basic 
framework:  to  the  parameterization  of  the  two  policymakers’  preferences,  to  the 
specification of the macroprudential authority’s preferences or instruments, and to shocks 
other than technology and financial. 
Our findings help explain why the major countries have introduced macroprudential 
policies only recently. Until now, given the prevalence of real shocks as determinants of 
economic dynamics, policies for stability centered on monetary policy, arguably the most 
powerful  tool  in  such  a  framework.  But the  global  crisis  has  made  it  clear  that  new 
instruments are needed to cope with an economic environment that includes  financial 
shocks.  Put  differently,  macroprudential  policies  were  not  introduced  until  recently 
because it is only now, with the financial crisis, that the need for them has been perceived.  
In addition to offering an explanation for this institutional evolution, our analysis 
suggests that macroprudential policy should not be treated as a substitute for monetary 
policy,  nor  an  all purpose  tool  for  stabilization,  but  as  a  useful  complement  to  the 
traditional macroeconomic policies for coping with financial or sector specific shocks. It 
is worth emphasizing once more that in normal times, if used improperly (i.e. without the 
necessary  cooperation  with  monetary  policy)  macroprudential  policy  could  actually 
damage rather than enhance macroeconomic stability.  
We have certainly not established that our results hold generally, as they depend 
upon  a  whole  series  of  assumptions  and  methodological  choices.  In  the  end,  our 
robustness  checks  run  up  against  the  limit  of  the  stylized  nature  of  our  model  –  for 
instance, the simplified  banking  system and the  limited  number of  financial  variables 
considered. Probably the most serious shortcoming of our model – which is shared by 
most modern macro models – is the lack of good proxies for systemic risk, the distortion 
that macroprudential policy should address. Systemic risk is extremely hard to define and 
measure, insofar as it may arise from a variety of sources and evolve over time. In our 
view, these difficulties are such that it essentially defies thorough modelling and can only 
be captured in limited, ad hoc ways. Improving this modelling is an important theme for 
future research. Adequate models should include the financial externalities and proxies   30 
for the systemic risk that macroprudential policies are intended to cope with; they should 
be  complex  enough  to  allow  for  meaningful  interaction  between  monetary  and 
macroprudential  policy;  and  they  should  probably  feature  an  important  role  for 
nonlinearities.  A second promising area for future work is alternative macroprudential 
instruments. The liquidity charges proposed by Perotti and Suarez (2010), for instance, 
should be relatively easy to model within our framework, if it is modified to incorporate a 
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Table 1 
 
INTERACTION BETWEEN MONETARY AND MACROPRUDENTIAL 
POLICIES UNDER TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS 
 
(The macroprudential instrument is banks’ capital requirement. Figures in brackets: 
percentage change with respect to the case of cooperation) 




Monetary policy only 
 
(c) 
R r  
0.998  0.999  0.999 




y c   0.924  64.765  1.212 
n r   0.999  0.993  0  Macroprudential 
policy  rule 
coefficient 
n c   1.979   4.038  0 
Joint loss            (13) 
(1)  0.12044  0.12533 (4.1)  0.12350 (2.5) 
Monetary policy loss (9)  0.05570  0.0605 (8.7)  0.0597 (7.3) 
Macroprudential loss (12)  0.06476   0.0648 (0.06)  0.06378 ( 1.5) 
Volatilities 
(2)        
  p s   0.478  0.505 (5.7)  0.476 ( 0.5) 
y s   3.267  3.257 ( 0.3)  3.390 (3.7) 
y L/ s   1.047  0.998 ( 4.7)  0.796 ( 23.9) 
r D s  
0.169  2.222 (1218)  0.10 ( 41.7) 
n sD  
0.662  1.34 (102.5)  0 
Notes: (1)
 For cooperation, value of (12); for non cooperation, sum of the values of (8) and (11). For the last column, 
value of (8).  
 (2) Standard deviations in percentage points.  
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Table 2  
 
INTERACTION BETWEEN MONETARY AND MACROPRUDENTIAL 
POLICIES UNDER FINANCIAL SHOCKS 
 
(The macroprudential instrument is banks’ capital requirement. Figures in brackets: 
percentage change with respect to the case of cooperation) 




Monetary policy only 
 
(c) 
R r  
0.995  0.999  0.999 




y c   13.539  3.728  4.855 
n r   0.999  0.999  0  Macroprudential 
policy  rule 
coefficient 
n c   9.683  9.680  0 
Joint loss            (13) 
(1)  1.0213  1.0802 (5.8)  1.1929 (16.8) 
Monetary policy loss (9)  0.0759  0.0381 ( 49.8)  0.0428 ( 43.6) 
Macroprudential loss (12)  0.9454  1.0421 (10.2)  1.1501 (21.7) 
Volatilities 
(2)        
  p s   0.847  0.807 ( 4.7)  0.793 ( 4.7) 
y s   2.272  2.500 (10.0)  2.685 (18.2) 
y L/ s   9.211  9.651 (4.8)  10.55 (14.6) 
r D s  
6.552  0.617 ( 90.6)  0.703 ( 89.3) 
n sD  
8.431  8.909 (5.7)  0 
Notes: (1)
 For cooperation, value of (12); for non cooperation, sum of the values of (8) and (11); for column (c), 
value of (8).  
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Table 3 
 
INTERACTION BETWEEN MONETARY AND MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES 
UNDER HOUSING DEMAND SHOCKS 
 
(The macroprudential instrument is the loan to value ratio. Figures in brackets: 
percentage change with respect to the case of cooperation) 




Monetary policy only 
 
(c) 
R r   0.840  0.999  0.999 




y c   0.624  1.180  0.749 
n r   0.999  0.999     Macroprudential 
policy  rule 
coefficient 
n c    1.292   1.292    
Joint loss            (13) 
(1)  0.1879  0.1932 (2.8)  1.4464 (670) 
Monetary policy loss (9)  0.0048  0.0001 ( 98)  0.0000 ( 100) 
Macroprudential loss (12)  0.1832  0.1931 (5.4)  1.4464 (690) 
Volatilities 
(2)        
  p s   0.08  0.06 ( 24)  0.02 ( 76) 
y s   0.11  0.14 (23.8)  0.10 ( 14) 
y L/ s   4.14  4.26 (2.8)  12.03 (191) 
r D s  
2.16  0.09 ( 96)  0.004 ( 100) 
m D s   3.44  3.45 (0.2)    
Notes: (1)
 For cooperation, value of (12); for non cooperation, sum of the values of (8) and (11); for column (c), value 
of (8).  
 (2) Standard deviations in percentage points.    35 
Table 4 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: ALTERNTATIVE POLICY PREFERENCES 
 
(The macroprudential instrument is banks’ capital requirement) 
  Technology shock  Financial shock 
Baseline 
ky,mp= ky,cb= 0.5 








ky,mp= ky,cb= 0.5 









  0.25  1.0  0.5    0.25  1.0  0.5 
  (A)  % change, monetary policy only case vs. cooperative case  
Joint loss (13) 
(1)  2.5  2.8  7.3  0.3  16.8  11.4  15.8  3.6 
Monetary policy loss (9)  7.3   1.3  17.2  2.8   43.6   24.9   31.5   15.0 
Macropr. policy loss (12)   1.5  6.7   0.9   1.9  21.7  12.6  27.5  4.5 
Volatilities 
(2)                 
            p s    0.5  0.7   1.3  2.3   6.4   1.9   6.8   0.3 
          y s   3.8   0.8  8.5  0.3  18.2  8.8  15.3  4.6 
          y L/ s    23.9  49.2   47.1   4.0  14.6  10.1  14.8  3.5 
         
r D s
   41.6  1.0   55.4  413.3   89.3   90.4  79.4   90.8 
         
n sD   –  –  –  –  –  –  –  – 
  (B) % change, non cooperation vs. cooperation 
Joint loss (13) 
(1)  4.1  1.6  5.9  0.2  5.8  0.8  5.3  0.9 
Monetary policy loss (9)  8.7   3.8  13.5  4.0   49.8   32   40   18.0 
Macropr. policy loss (12)  0.1  6.8   0.4   3.3  10.2  1.9  10.6  1.8 
Volatilities 
(2)                 
            p s   5.7  2.9  12. 1.9   4.7  0.0   5.3  0.3 
          y s    0.3   4.5   0.6  0.9  10.0  1.2  7.7  2.5 
          y L/ s    4.7  61.9  2.7   18.2  4.8  0.6  5.2  0.9 
         
r D s
  1218  109 172 421.3   90.6   92   83   91 
         
n sD   102.5  9.4   8.7   11.1  5.7  5.2  2.8   2.9 
Notes:  (1)  Percentage  changes  in  the  value  of  the  loss  function  in  the  non cooperative  game,  with  respect  to  the  cooperative 
equilibrium.  
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Figure 1 
IMPULSE RESPONSES 
(a) Negative technology shock 




























Cooperative Non-cooperative Monetary policy only





























(b) Negative financial shock 





























Cooperative Non-cooperative Monetary policy only






























Note: All the impulse responses are measured as percentage deviation from the steady state.   37 
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